The methods used to select public officials affect the preferences they bring to office, the incentives they face while in office, and, ultimately, the policy goals they pursue. We use a principal-agent framework to theorize about how the preferences and actions of local election officials differ depending on whether they are elected or appointed. We test these predictions with a dataset that includes the survey responses of 1,200 Wisconsin local election officials, structured interviews, census data, and returns from the 2008 presidential election. Drawing upon a natural experiment in how officials are selected, we find that, compared to appointed officials, elected officials express greater support for voter access and express less concern about ballot security and administrative costs. For appointed officials, we find that voter turnout in a municipality is lower when the local election official's self-reported partisanship differs from the partisanship of the electorate, but only in cases where the official is a Republican.
1
One of the most important procedural questions in a democratic republic is how public officials are chosen. Different methods of selection may attract varying types of officials and introduce different behavioral incentives in office. A fundamental dilemma in any political system is finding appropriate structures of control and accountability over administrative functions. Appointed officials may be more insulated from the public and thus motivated by their personal policy preferences or expertise, or the preferences of the officials who appointed them, while elected officials should be more responsive to the demands of the electorate. Appointment versus election might also condition how much the partisan preferences of the official affect their actions. It short, it is plausible that the method of selection distort administrative behavior and policy outcomes in systematic ways.
In this paper we take advantage of unique data from Wisconsin to show that the method of selection affects the policy preferences of local election officials (LEOs) and voter turnout in their jurisdictions. We theorize that the two methods of selection -appointment versus electioninfluence the major dimension of policy discretion in the field of elections, namely voter access versus system security. We further hypothesize that appointment grants LEOs discretion to increase turnout if they share the partisan preferences of their constituents. The analyses produce three key findings. First, although partisanship does not influence LEO attitudes toward voter access, elected officials are more supportive of policies such as absentee voting and election day registration that are thought to promote access over security and are popular with voters. Second, elected LEOs produce slightly higher levels of voter turnout, suggesting that attitudinal differences caused by selection translate into behavior in office. Third, and more striking, correspondence between the LEO's partisanship and that of her constituents has a substantial affect on voter turnout for appointed LEOs, but only when they are Republican. We view these results as generally consistent with the notion that elected officials are more inclined than appointed officials to represent and pursue the preferences of the electorate and speculate about why partisanship only appears to affect Republican officials.
We begin with a discussion of how election officials in the United States influence election administration, and point to evidence that some may do so to serve partisan interests.
Next we consider the importance of different selection methods, and draw upon principal-agent theory to hypothesize that elected officials have stronger incentives than appointed officials to respond to public preferences by increasing voter access and turnout. Taking advantage of data on LEOs from Wisconsin, we then show that method of selection for local election officials affects their attitudes toward policies and levels of voter turnout.
Methods of Selection and Partisanship in Election Administration
Because of the discretion granted to them, election officials are perceived to have substantial influence on elections.
1 Yet a recent analysis concludes that "we don't know what institutional arrangements will produce the best election administration [due] to the shortage of research on the subject" (Tokaji 2009, 10) . In particular, given the many calls by reformers to change how LEOs are selected, it is surprising that the impact of various methods has not been studied extensively (cf., . We know little about how election versus appointment affects the manner in which elections are administered. Just over half of the nation's many local election officials are elected directly (Fischer and Coleman 2008) , yet the public clearly prefers that election officials be elected (Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn 2008) . Is this disjuncture consequential?
In this section we outline a theory of how the method for selecting election officials influences those officials' policy attitudes and ultimately voter turnout. We employ a principalagent framework to suggest that elected election officials will care more about perceived voter wishes for convenience in the voting process than will their appointed counterparts, and that this difference will translate into behavior in office that affects voter turnout. We also hypothesize that the method by which we select election officials moderates the impact of partisanship on election administration. Before we outline this theory, we point to evidence on the relevance of methods of selection in other policy areas, the influence of local election officials on electoral outcomes, as well as the role of partisanship in the exercise of that influence.
Evidence from a variety of contexts already shows that the method for selecting public officials is consequential, with most analyses showing that officials who are directly elected by the public are more responsive to the perceived wishes of citizens. Research reveals that elected judges, prosecutors, and regulators are more likely than their appointed counterparts to be consumer-oriented and punitive toward criminals (Besley and Coate 2003; Gordon and Huber 2007; Huber and Gordon 2004; Kwoka 2002; Primeaux and Mann 1985) . For example, Brace and Boyea (2008) find that the influence of public support for capital punishment on judicial willingness to uphold death sentences is contingent on whether a judge is elected or not. In states where judges were not elected, public opinion had no impact on judicial decisions.
Principal-agent theory is a useful framework for explaining these effects. Generally speaking, the theory considers situations in which a principal delegates authority to an agent, who is authorized to act. This arrangement has advantages for the principal, namely a division of labor, but it also has liabilities. She suffers from an inability to closely monitor the agent's actions. This administrative slack gives the agent more discretion and thus opens the possibility that her actions will stray from the principal's preferences. The method by which agents are selected thus becomes a crucial variable precisely because it affects whether the official is immediately accountable to the public or only quite distantly through an appointing authority with somewhat different preferences.
Extending the empirical analysis of selection method to election administration raises two additional issues. First is the prominence of partisanship. Unlike many other areas of public administration, elections are inherently partisan affairs. Election officials often win their positions as a result of partisan connections, and they are responsible for conducting elections in which partisan candidates are seeking office. Moreover, the public constituencies they serve display partisan preferences in their voting patterns. This raises the concern that the partisanship of a local election official can clash with that of the principals she serves.
Second is the highly decentralized nature of the system. The American electoral apparatus is administered at the county and municipal levels by approximately 10,000 local election officials. 2 The local nature of election administration creates opportunities for variation in implementation (Ewald 2009 ). This variation can come from a "street-level" choice taken where the law is silent or by deliberate or accidental disregard of the rules during the implementation process Lipsky 1980) . A small amount of mischief, incompetence, or selective effort by a LEO could alter the likelihood that individuals turn out to vote, voters' perception that that their vote will be counted, and ultimately the electoral fates of candidates.
2 Fischer and Coleman (2008) state that there are "more than 9,000" local election officials. More recently, Kimball et al. (2010) put the number at 10,370.
Because the importance of LEOs has only come to be appreciated since problems appeared after the 2000 presidential election, scholars do not know how the principal-agent relationship works in these important settings. The mere possibility that election officials administer elections in a way that serves their partisan interests feeds the general perception that relatively few election administrators are completely independent from political pressures (Tokaji 2009 ). The solution might be to recruit non-partisan election officials and to insulate them from political pressures altogether, a position strongly favored by the public (Alvarez, Hall, and Lewellyn 2008) . The Carter-Baker Commission's landmark report strongly recommended that "non-partisan structures of election administration are very important, and election administrators should be neutral, professional, and impartial" (2005, 50) . But these beliefs leave two questions unanswered. First, does officially making election administration non-partisan actually eliminate partisan action in office? Second, does the choice of election or appointment influence how much partisanship shapes election administration?
Despite massive efforts at the state and federal level to provide more regulation of elections, lawmakers have yet to -and likely cannot -eliminate all of the discretion granted to election administrators. The passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002 was intended, in part, to remedy these concerns by establishing common standards for election administration across the United States. Although HAVA resulted in better voting technology and improved voter registration processes (Stewart 2011) , it did little to dampen variation in administrative behavior at the local level. Election officials retain authority over a wide variety of policy choices, including ballot design, the use of voting technology, the treatment of provisional ballots, standards for counting absentee ballots, public education about registration, and the implementation of voter identification rules . Indeed, surveys of LEOs reveal that they have leeway in a number of other areas: hiring poll workers, overseeing recounts, authorizing budgets, policing misconduct at the polls, purchasing voting equipment, and maintaining voter registration databases (Fischer and Coleman 2008) . They enjoy substantial autonomy on the number, hours, and location of polling places, and the supply of workers and ballots at these locations. They often have additional latitude in how much effort to expend on particular goals. Officials may proactively engage the media and specific community groups such as students or senior citizens to educate voters on the requirements to vote. It is this discretion that makes the method of selection a key contingency.
Observing the consequences of discretion is difficult. The myriad of ways in which election officials can make it harder or easier to vote creates a "black box" problem for researchers in that the actual behavior that leads to electoral outcomes may be difficult to observe. Moreover, officials need not exercise this decision-making authority transparently, maliciously, or even consciously for their decisions to affect outcomes. Yet the attitudes and actions of LEOs may well be shaped by which principals employ them and whether their partisan preferences match those of the constituencies they serve.
Expectations about the Method of Selection
The method of selection literature relies upon a principal-agent logic, which we elaborate upon here. In this framework, the public is the principal, and the public official is the agent.
Elected officials are directly accountable to voters, but voters can control an appointed election official only indirectly through an intermediary such as a mayor or elected board. A potential implication is that, by adding an intermediate actor to the hierarchy, institutions that feature appointed election officials, as opposed to elected officials, potentially weaken principal-agent control (e.g., Besley and Coate 2003) . Moreover, the officials we examine have a limited set of duties that revolve around election administration, making it easier for the public to hold them accountable. In contrast, appointed officials are hired by municipal authorities, who are responsible for a much wider set of responsibilities. To the degree that this multidimensionality further weakens the ability of voters to monitor and sanction election officials, it may effectively transform the municipal authority into the principal. As a result, it is reasonable to treat elected and appointed officials as having different principals. Although not a perfect dichotomy, we hypothesize that the relevant principals for an elected LEO are more likely to reflect public desire for convenience whereas principals for an appointed LEO will put more value on maintaining security.
Theorizing appointed and elected officials as having different principals resonates with Alesina and Tabellini's (2007) observation that principal-agent theories of public control of government must account for the different motivations of the agent, depending on whether they are an elected official or an appointed bureaucrat. Both wish to maintain their positions, but "different accountability mechanisms induce two behavioral differences between a bureaucrat and a politician" (170). They contend that "[appointed] Bureaucrats want to signal their competence for career concerns, [elected] politicians for reelection purposes" (177). In short, elected and appointed officials have different principals, face different returns on policy performance, and will pursue different goals.
The mayor or board members who make appointments are likely to prioritize different aspects of election administration than does the general public. Because they oversee all aspects of municipal budgets, they are relatively more likely to focus on minimizing the costs of running elections. And because their public reputations depend on problem-free administration of municipal services, they are concerned about violations of security. By controlling costs and limiting security violations, the appointers demonstrate more risk-aversion in election administration than would the typical voter. In subtle and perhaps more overt ways, they may induce these preferences in election officials they appoint.
The appointed official may be motivated by particular career concerns which may lead them to value most the perceptions of their professional peers and employers (Alesina and Tabellini 2007) . In the case of election administration, appointed officials are not entirely independent. They remain accountable to elected officials and, indirectly, to the voters. The general theory we present merely stipulates that the addition of an intermediary weakens voters' ability to hold officials accountable. This theory implies that if election officials have policy goals that differ from those of the electorate, then those who are appointed may be better able than those who are elected to pursue these divergent goals without fear of losing their jobs. It also implies that elected election officials might have policy goals that better match the preferences of the electorate than appointed election officials because they may have been selected precisely for their views on election administration. In other words, whether their policy goals and attitudes are hard-wired or induced through institutional incentives, one might expect a divergence in preferences between elected and appointed election officials.
To formulate more precise empirical hypotheses, we further assume that voters are most concerned about making the voting process convenient (Katosh and Traugott 1982) . Voters want short lines and convenient practices such as election day registration (EDR) and early voting.
Studies of Oregon's convenient vote-by-mail system, for example, showed strong initial support (76.5%) and even stronger support five years later (80.9%; Southwell and Burchett, 1997.; Southwell, 2004 (Alvarez et al. 2011 ). This is not to say that voters lack concern for the costs of elections or the possibility of election crimes. 3 Indeed, voters in Mississippi recently endorsed a provision to implement voter ID. Rather, we posit that relative to municipal authorities, voters
give higher priority to the values of access and convenience and less to finances and security.
LEOs who are elected will thus be more apt to administer elections in a way that favors great voter turnout. If in doubt, they have an incentive to enable rather than deny access for a potential voter. Because they need to satisfy the electorate to keep their jobs, elected LEOs will be comparatively less concerned than appointed LEOs about administrative costs and security.
Appointed LEOs will have more discretion when it comes to affecting turnout.
In addition to their method of selection, there is evidence that the partisanship of election officials influences their actions. Kimball and Baybeck (2010) show that LEOs from opposing parties take divergent positions on practices that provide greater voter access and combat fraud.
If LEO partisanship matters, it should depend on whether the official's preferences correspond or conflict with those of their constituents. One way to identify a divergence in the preferences of election officials and their electorates is by comparing the partisanship of officials with that of voters in their municipalities. Some evidence has already emerged showing the match between voters and LEOs to be consequential. Using this simple approach, one provocative analysis found that local election officials increase turnout among voters with common partisan affiliation (Bassi, Morton, and Trounstine 2008) . We thus hypothesize Democratic (Republican) officials in Democratic (Republican) municipalities should be more inclined to administer elections in ways that enhance voter turnout than Democratic (Republican) officials in Republican (Democratic) municipalities. This is in addition to the direct effects of partisanship in which Democrats are expected to put greater emphasis on voter convenience than
Republicans.
There is one more wrinkle to the argument that brings both selection method and partisanship into a single explanatory framework. While there is some evidence to suggest that partisan preferences matter to election administration, such research has not considered if partisan influence might be constrained or encouraged by method of selection. As the above principal-agent theory indicates, the electorate is less able to hold appointed election officials accountable for administering elections in ways with which they disagree. Appointed LEOs whose partisan preferences differ from those of the electorate should therefore be better able to administer elections in ways that advantage their party. We hypothesize that a partisan mismatch will have more impact on voter turnout in municipalities with appointed election officials than in those with elected LEOs. Not only are appointed officials less directly accountable to voters, thus allowing their partisan preferences to shape behavior in office, but the municipal authorities who appointed them are likely to share their preferences to some degree, providing another motivation for actions to follow from personal views.
There are good reasons to believe that the effects of selection method will be constrained.
The norms of professional behavior, limits set by federal and state law, and a paucity of resources will prevent local election officials from using their autonomy -intentionally or notto produce large differences in turnout. Given the multitude of factors beyond the clerk's control that shape turnout, their impact will fall within a modest range of possibilities. Further, as we explain below, municipal LEOs in our Wisconsin application are officially non-partisan.
Although it seems clear that many have partisan attachments -which they readily admit in our surveys -the lack of public partisanship should dampen effects.
The Setting: Election Administration in Wisconsin
Wisconsin is a medium-sized "battleground" state with approximately four million eligible voters. There are over 1,830 municipal clerks serving communities whose populations range from 37 to nearly 600,000 individuals. Wisconsin law mandates that each municipality have a non-partisan clerk who is responsible for conducting elections and other administrative duties. This decentralized structure offers advantages in testing our hypotheses. The large sample, range of backgrounds, and mix of selection methods provides us with an unusual opportunity to explore the impact of selection method on election officials' policy preferences and the turnout they help produce. For all of the differences in scale and context, most of the electoral responsibilities of these LEOs are similar. Particularly helpful in our application is that clerks vary in how they are selected. About 60% are elected and 40% are appointed. Moreover, the method of selection is reasonably exogenous to the outcome variables we consider. The "treatment" variable of selection method was largely set by the form of governments established by the state constitution in 1848 and to a much lesser degree by local incorporation decisions in the 19th century and early 20th century.
To the degree that we can identify variables that distinguish between municipalities with elected 5 Although a single-state study has real benefits in terms of identifying causal processes, it can also raise questions about generalizability. Fortunately Wisconsin is a typical state in many regards: it ranks 20 th in population, 23 rd in personal income (with a state median that is nearly identical to the national average, $52,103 compared to $52,029), 26 th in home ownership, 27 th in population density, and 31 st in percent urban. The state is more white than the nation (89.4% compared to 79.6%), but Wisconsin's racial profile is still in the middle of the pack, ranking 17 th in white population, 30 th in the number of African Americans, and 31 st in Hispanic population. The state does have an extremely decentralized system of election administration, but that puts it in league with states such as Michigan, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire where elections are also run at the local level. While many states use partisan officials to run elections, Wisconsin is more typical than many assume. report only onefifth of jurisdictions are administered by Republicans and one-fourth by Democrats. The largest group -two-fifthsare nonpartisan. About the only significant and relevant area in which Wisconsin is an outlier is in voter turnout: it consistently ranks among the top states in the nation. However, the baseline level of turnout is not as important for our analysis as variation in turnout across jurisdictions. 6 In addition to administering elections, clerks provide support for local boards and councils, maintain the municipal office, handle communications, issue licenses, and keep municipal records. Apart from the fact that appointed clerks are also more likely to also serve as municipal treasurer (which we control for in our statistical models), the essential duties of elected and appointed clerks are the same. and appointed LEOs, our multivariate models control for them. Before moving to those models, further discussion of the history behind method of selection is necessary.
Clerks work in one of three types of Wisconsin municipalities: city, village, or town.
Elected clerks are chosen in non-partisan elections in the spring of odd-numbered years, and typically have terms of two years. By constitutional design, cities and villages are incorporated and as such are free to appoint or elect their clerks without much interference; most opted for appointment early in their histories. In contrast, the default procedure for towns is to elect their clerks.
7 As a result, about 80% of clerks are appointed in villages and cities but 80% of are elected in towns. This somewhat arbitrary linkage between municipality types and selection methods provides a situation that closely approximates a natural experiment.
Whether a municipality is designated as a town or village is largely a historical matter of constitutional design. Selection methods have varied little enough over the ensuing 160 years that they can be treated as nearly randomly assigned to municipalities. 8 There has been some switching between municipal types over time, but there is no evidence that the desire for a different method of LEO selection was the motivation. Instead, some cities and villages incorporated out of towns as populations grew and its residents wanted more municipal services (Paddock 1997) . 9 This means that whether a clerk is appointed or elected is nearly exogenous, largely an accident of history. That 96% of municipality types have been in place since 1960 7 A clerk's position remains elected unless a town referendum held within 45 days of a spring election implements appointment. 8 Switches from town to city or village largely stopped in the Progressive Era, thus establishing the form of government and method of selection a century before our analysis. 9 Having more services might be regarded as an important difference between towns and villages that might impact the results. But if such an effect exists, it should work in a way that dampens evidence supporting our primary hypothesis, rather than support it. Municipalities with more services tend to have greater turnout (Hajnal and Lewis 2003; Wood 2003) . Since most elected officials represent towns, any positive relationship with turnout occurs despite the provision of fewer services. Cities and villages also tend to have more elected positions than do towns. If turnout is driven in part by the number of offices selected by voters, we would expect appointed town clerks to display more not less support for voter access.
leaves us reasonably confident that cross-sectional analysis provides sufficient evidence of the causal effects of selection method (Paddock 1997) .
Because only about 10% of Wisconsin municipalities are cities, we consider whether towns and villages differ in ways that might produce spurious relationships between partisanship, method of selection, clerk attitudes, and turnout. 10 One potentially important difference between towns and villages for our analysis of turnout is population density (Preuss 1981). In Wisconsin, towns are much less densely populated than villages because they generally cover a much larger area of land. We therefore control for this potential confound in our statistical models.
Alternatively, one could employ a dummy variable for towns or villages as an instrument for the method of selection. In models not reported here, we find similar results using this statistical approach.
A final advantage of the Wisconsin system is that it allows us to test the impact of employing non-partisan elected officials, a system strongly preferred by the public (Alvarez, Hall and Llewellyn 2008) . This preference reflects, no doubt, a desire for a strong, direct, form of accountability, while at the same time avoiding the negative aspects of partisanship. Yet the uncertainties of this selection model lead Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn (2008, 341) to conclude that "additional research is needed to determine if the public's choice for elected, non-partisan election boards is also the electoral governance structure which is best able to prevent electoral fraud and to instill confidence in voters that the process is fair." As we explain below, our survey also asked clerks for their self-identifications on a standard scale of political partisanship. This allows us to contrast election and appointment directly, and analyze whether the official absence of party labels truly translates to non-partisan administration.
Data Sources
To investigate the impact of method of appointment and partisanship on election administration, we created a data set on clerks and their municipalities from four sources. We matched all of the data at the municipal level, giving us a combined database of clerk characteristics, clerk attitudes, local election practices, voting data, and census data. Our final merged dataset consisted of 1,388 observations. Missing data reduces the effective sample size to 1,225 for most of our statistical models. These data give us a unique vantage point for examining how clerk characteristics and attitudes can affect election outcomes.
Qualitative Data on Clerk Attitudes
To provide a flavor of the qualitative data from clerk surveys and interviews, 12 we offer responses from clerks on two common practices: election day registration and absentee voting.
EDR provides access by allowing voters to register and vote at the polling place. Absentee voting also provides convenience by allowing voters to cast ballots in advance of election day and to do so by mail or in person. 13 In providing greater access, however, there are concerns that EDR and absentee voting increase the costs of running elections and provide more opportunities for security breaches and other forms of voter fraud. Thus, EDR and absentee voting provide 12 The quotes from the clerks cannot be regarded as a test of the hypotheses, but serve instead to establish the plausibility of our hypotheses and illustrate how the motivations of clerks are expressed. useful windows into the tension between access, which voters want, and efficiency and security, which municipal officials desire.
The interviews and surveys show that clerks often have strongly held views about election processes, voter responsibilities, and the appropriate balance between voter convenience and administrative costs. 14 On the whole, and consistent with our expectations, we found that elected clerks were more supportive of efforts to expand access and make voting more convenient, while appointed clerks were more concerned about the administrative burdens imposed by EDR and absentee voting.
EDR creates administrative headaches for the election officials who must make available separate processes to register and vote on election day. This comment from an appointed clerk was typical:
Election day registration is a nightmare. It increases pressure at the polls, where we have a hard time finding adequate numbers of staff to work. The workers tend to be elderly and get flustered under the stress of a large election, or have a hard time simply reading and following the forms. There are so many mistakes made that would not happen if we closed registration three-plus weeks before the election.
To a greater extent than elected clerks, appointed clerks explicitly criticized voters for wanting additional convenience in voting, as the following quotes illustrate.
Election day registration is being abused by people who have begun to presume that it is their right. I think there should be a provision to allow for only certain limited EDR. There is no reason that the vast majority of the voters cannot register at least 30 days prior to the election. I believe that voting is both a privilege and a right and more people need to act responsibly and try to be better prepared. There is enough information available that people can easily find out where to register and what proof of residency they need to bring with them.
Absentee voting has become the lazy person's way of life. . . The "old" rule of needing a reason to vote absentee should be put back in place so that only those who need to vote by absentee would vote by that means.
An elected clerk, on the other hand, supported EDR as a convenience to voters, despite the crunch it created on election day:
I think it's a good thing for the voters because they don't have to plan ahead. And it probably does increase the number of people voting, coming out to vote. On the administrative side, it's difficult to manage hundreds and hundreds of registrations very close to an election day.
Elected clerks also seemed more supportive of the need for absentee voting, despite the increase work load and mailing costs: "It definitely takes up more of my work time. I like people being able to vote absentee. I get very disappointed when they do not return their ballot."
Appointed clerks also seemed to be more concerned about the implications of EDR for ballot security and voter fraud than elected clerks:
Election day registration creates such a large post-election burden. If Wisconsin wants to make changes to elections in Wisconsin this should be eliminated. By doing so I think it could reduce voter fraud and potential errors by poll workers.
The day before the election should be the last day to register in the clerk's office.
If nothing else, these responses suggest that clerks are not neutral in how they assess their role.
They have clear ideas about appropriate policy, even if their views are inconsistent with existing laws. Although clerks' attitudes are the result of many factors, including partisan and ideological preferences, the differences in views between elected and appointed clerks suggests that they are at least partly connected to the principals who employ them. It seems reasonable to expect that these views will influence the execution of their jobs. However, qualitative data cannot establish the existence of systematic differences between elected and appointed clerks' attitudes about voting practices and voter turnout. For that we turn to quantitative analysis.
Measures
We present two models, first estimating the effects of selection method and partisanship first on clerk attitudes about policies and then on voter turnout. We begin with a working assumption that clerk attitudes toward election policies will be a function of clerk and municipality characteristics, and method of selection. Above we hypothesize that the enhanced accountability to voters provided by direct election should lead elected LEOs to be more supportive than appointed clerks of initiatives that facilitate voting, such as EDR and absentee voting, and that these preferences should translate to enhanced voter turnout. To measure clerk attitudes about EDR we asked clerks to rate on a seven-point scale their agreement with the following statements: "Election day registration makes it more difficult to protect the security of the voting process"; "Election day registration should be considered a voter's right"; "Election day registration increases the administrative burden on election officials like me"; and, "The benefits of election day registration outweigh the costs." For mail-in absentee voting, we asked clerks to rate their agreement with the following statements: "The authenticity of a mail absentee ballot is difficult to verify"; "Mail absentee voting should be considered a voter's right"; and, "The benefits of mail absentee voting outweigh the costs."
These seven measures capture many of the elements that might divide clerks serving principals with differing priorities. The upper half of leans most strongly in the other direction. The two items that ask directly about the benefits versus the costs place LEOs about one point above the scale's midpoint.
Table 1 about here
As we expected, there are clear differences in the attitudes of elected and appointed clerks. Elected clerks, to a far greater degree that appointed clerks, were supportive of both EDR and absentee voting, and less concerned with administrative costs. The differences between using simple t-tests the two groups were statistically significant at .01 or above for all of the attitudinal items (results not shown). These results provide initial support for our claim that elected officials are more responsive to voter preferences than are appointed officials.
Because previous work has suggested that partisanship can affect clerk behavior, we asked clerks to specify their partisanship using the American National Election Study (ANES)
item, a single seven-point scale running from "Strong Democrat" to "Strong Republican." For some of the statistical analyses we also created party dummy variables, collapsing the strong partisans, weak partisans, and leaners into a single group. The models include a dummy for each major party, with pure independents as the reference category. Despite the official non-partisan nature of these offices and professional norms against partisanship, LEOs were quite willing to admit their partisan attachments. 16 Less than a third of clerks put themselves in the "pure independent" category. Another third called themselves "strong" or "weak" partisans, with the remainder identified as leaners. As Table 1 shows, our categorical coding produces a breakdown that is roughly equally divided among self-identified Democrats, Republicans, and independents.
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The partisan preferences of constituents are measured using the 2008 presidential vote.
Interacting this measure with the clerk's partisanship provides a test of whether LEO discretion is exercised differently when the preferences of the principal differ from those of the agent. If one were to dichotomize the vote share measure, one would conclude that 29% of clerks are "out of step" with their constituents politically.
The specification allows us to determine whether clerks' attitudes and voter turnout is shaped directly by clerk partisanship, by constituency preferences, or a mismatch between the two. Because the interaction term is constructed separately for Democratic and Republican
LEOs, we can also observe whether the correspondence in preferences has a greater impact for one party or the other. Moreover, in our models of voter turnout, we allow this effect to vary with the method of selection to determine whether divergence between the principal and agent is more consequential when the agent is elected or appointed.
Four other clerk control variables also are included. In Wisconsin many small-town municipal clerks rely on county clerks for administrative support, such as for the processing of voter registration forms. We include a dummy variable to account for these "reliers." We also cluster the standard errors by county in the event that some unmeasured characteristic generates correlations among municipal clerks from the same county. The survey also asked whether or not the clerk plans to seek higher office in the future. This item controls for the possibility that officials with "progressive" career ambition might be more likely to support initiatives that are popular with voters. We controlled for whether a clerk also serves as treasurer for her municipality, a somewhat common occurrence in Wisconsin. This is to avoid a confounding association with the method of selection and to test the idea that clerks who also keep the municipal books will be more attentive to the costs of voting. Finally, we include a measure of how many years clerks have been in their positions, to check if longer-serving clerks believe and act differently, either as a result of generational differences or because of accumulated experience (Moynihan and Silva 2008) . The data in Table 1 show that clerks are mostly reliers, have about 12 years of experience on average, and that about one in five plan to pursue higher office.
The models also control for demographic characteristics of the clerk's municipality. We use Census measures of median family income, population density, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the overall population size, and the percentage of the population that is Black. We also include Obama's vote share in the municipality. This is necessary to include the interaction term between constituency partisanship and LEO partisanship. It is also an interesting control in its own right because it tests whether more Democratic jurisdictions disproportionately prioritize voter access. Again, there is tremendous variation in these measures, which should help isolate how the method of selection is associated with clerks' attitudes toward election policy. Table 2 presents the results of ordered logit models for each of the seven attitudinal measures. The findings are straightforward. In all seven models the method of selection exerts a strong and statistically significant effect in the expected direction. Elected clerks are more likely to see EDR as a right, as being worth the costs, and engendering relatively low administrative burdens, whereas appointed clerks are more likely to view EDR as jeopardizing the security of the voting process and increasing administrative burdens. Similarly, elected clerks are more likely to view absentee voting as a right and worth the costs, and are less concerned about the difficulty of verifying the identities of absentee voters. We display these effects in Figure 1 , which plots the point estimates and 90% confidence intervals for each of the seven dependent variables. The figure makes clear how consistently variation in principals affects the placements of LEOs on the continuum between access and security.
Clerk Attitude Results
It appears that election as a means of selection affects the kind of people who take office, shapes their preferences by requiring that they be accountable first to the voters who elected them, or both. Serving different principals results in divergent preferences among agents: elected clerks are more supportive of policies promoting voter access than appointed clerks, and they are less concerned than appointed clerks about vote security and administrative costs.
Table 2 and Figure 1 about here
The LEO's partisan proclivities, in contrast, show no direct effects on their attitudes. Selfidentified Democrats and Republicans do not differ when it comes to their positions on the use of EDR and absentee voting as they relate to voter access and system security. There is some evidence that the preferences of constituents influence LEO attitudes. When it comes to EDR, municipalities with strong Democratic tendencies -as measured by the Obama vote share -are more supportive of access and less concerned about security. 18 But there is little support for the hypothesis that LEO partisanship and constituency partisanship interact. In only one case is the "mismatch" between the clerk and her constituents statistically significant. It is unsurprising that the congruence between LEO and constituent preferences would have limited influence on LEO attitudes. This suggests that views toward election practices are a fairly straightforward function of the method of selection and partisanship itself, not a strategic response to how clerks' partisan views compare to those of the voters they serve. Lacking theoretical or empirical reasons to expect an interaction between partisan preferences and method of selection when it comes to attitudes, we leave the analysis of LEO opinions there.
Some of the control variables are also of interest. Few LEO characteristics are significant, with the exception of relier status. Relier clerks are more supportive of voter access in three of the seven models, perhaps because county clerks rather than the reliers face the administrative burden of processing EDR forms on election night. In several cases it appears that clerks who also serve as treasurers are actually less concerned about security and costs. Ambition for higher office is unrelated to any of the attitudes. Time in office has little consistent effect on any attitudes. The general absence of effects associated with clerk backgrounds, responsibilities, ambition, and especially municipality type makes it all the more striking that method of selection exhibits such a strong and consistent influence on attitudes toward EDR and absentee voting.
Demographics of the constituencies also show inconsistent results, with the exception of median income. Municipalities with lower incomes have clerks who are more supportive of voter access over security. This variable could be a proxy for allegiances with the Democratic party that go beyond pure voting habits or might reflect more general concerns of those with lower incomes about exclusion from the political process. LEOs serving higher educated electorates are more likely to support access when it comes to absentee voting but not EDR. Population itself has no effect, but communities with greater population density are represented by clerks who
give greater priority to security rather than access. The racial composition of a municipality appears to have no impact.
Turnout Results
Knowing that the attitudes of LEOs can be shaped by their method of selection is interesting, but it carries more weight if we can identify tangible consequences of different principals. Voter turnout is an important indicator because it is frequently viewed as the best overall measure of mass political participation and because it presents a challenge for demonstrating the influence of LEO discretion. It is one thing to learn that the method of selection affect how some clerks act in office, but it is a higher hurdle to show that variation in the principal reaches all the way to outcomes such as the level of voter involvement.
We draw upon the EAC survey to analyze voter turnout in the 2008 presidential election.
Our denominator (the municipal level voting age population estimates) comes from the Wisconsin Demographic Services Center of the Wisconsin Department of Administration. 19 We employ OLS models using the same specifications as the attitudinal models above, but with turnout as the dependent variable.
The first column of Table 3 reports on turnout for all of the municipalities in our dataset.
The coefficient on the method of selection variable suggests that turnout is about 1.5 points higher in municipalities with elected clerks. This is consistent with our conjecture that elected clerks should be more concerned than appointed clerks with enhancing access to the polls. While an effect of a point or two might seem small compared to the impact of other forces such as demographics, campaign competitiveness, and political culture, we find it remarkable that there 19 The VAP estimates are based on Census data and the Demographic Services Center describes their methods as follows, "Starting with the 2005 Population Estimates, the voting age population for municipalities and counties now uses the proportion of persons 18 years and over at the most recent Census multiplied by a factor of changing portion of 18 years and over in our Population Projections by Single Year of Age. Then we multiply that result by the total municipal population estimate for the current year. Demographic Services identifies these estimates to municipal and county clerks as "courtesy" figures to assist them in approximating the number of ballots that need to be printed and distributed for elections" (http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs_view2.asp?docid=4165, p.5).
is enough discretion for the method of selection to nonetheless affect levels of participation despite the many more obvious forces influencing voting turnout.
Of equal interest is the interaction between LEO and constituency partisanship. The model suggests that the effect of constituency preferences is moderated by the clerk's partisanship, but only when she identifies as a Republican. Among GOP clerks, the more Democratic the constituency, the lower turnout is. This is a striking result, especially because the magnitude of the interaction term is substantial. An increase of one standard deviation in the Obama vote (roughly 10 percentage points) results in a decrease in turnout of 1.5 points. It is not immediately clear why the effect is limited to Republican office holders.
It is possible that this effect is due to the actions of citizens rather than the LEO.
Following research showing that people are more likely to vote when represented by politicians who are like them demographically (e.g., Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001) , one could hypothesize that people are more motivated to vote if their election administrator shares their partisanship. We think this mechanism is unlikely for two reasons. First, it requires constituents to know the partisanship of their LEO. This is probably not common knowledge, especially in a state where clerks are officially non-partisan. The clerk is far more likely to know the partisan tendencies or their constituents than the other way around. Second, below we will show that this effect only holds for appointed clerks. Our theory explains why the interaction effect would be conditional on the method of selection. There is no obvious logic for why voters would condition their participation on both the clerk's partisanship and the clerk's selection method.
Table 3 about here
Before turning to that analysis, we observe that control variables operate largely as expected. Turnout is significantly higher in municipalities where residents have higher incomes and more formal education, two variables known to influence participation at the individual and aggregate levels. Turnout is also higher where the constituency is more racially homogeneous and where the population is less dense.
Our theory posits that the method of selection should govern the degree to which LEOs are faithful to the preferences of their principals. We conjectured that being elected would motivate LEOs to prioritize actions that favor voter access and convenience whereas appointment by a municipal authority would give greater weight to security and cost considerations, and the attitudinal results reported in Table 2 support this hypothesis. Whereas election forces accountability to the electorate generally, appointment allows a clerk to be attentive to their own views. In short, the divergence between clerk and constituent partisanship will be more consequential when the clerk is not directly elected by those same constituents.
We further test for this conditional relationship in the final two columns of Table 3 In additional analyses we attempted to verify the robustness of the result by examining the connection between clerk attitudes and turnout, our two dependent variables, to determine whether the attitudes about access, security, and costs expressed in Table 2 might explain levels of voter turnout in Table 3 . It is possible that clerks who are more concerned about cost and security in the use of EDR and absentee voting might take actions to lower voter turnout. We examined this possibility by conducting both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis on the eight attitudinal items and then adding the resulting factor scores as independent variables in the turnout models. None of the attitudinal factors had a statistically significant effect on turnout, even when the method of selection variable was omitted. Nor did their inclusion in the Table 3 models alter coefficient values of other variables in the models. 21 This non-finding is revealing.
It suggests that clerks' efforts to increase or decrease turnout were not driven by their philosophical views on voter access and ballot security, but by methods of selection and partisan mismatch. Even after we control for clerk attitudes, voter turnout is higher when a clerk is elected, when the clerk's partisanship is congruent with voter partisanship, and when a clerk matches the partisanship of the municipality and is appointed.
Conclusion
Given the centrality of fair elections to democratic legitimacy, it is vital to understand the impact selection method has on election officials' policy preferences and voter turnout. As the individuals who determine the staffing and functioning of polling places, local election officials are indeed the "administrators of democracy" (Moynihan and Silva 2008 Although we are confident that our results have shown how selection method affects election administration, identifying the precise mechanisms through which this occurs remains for future research. Neither our theory nor our empirical model makes a claim about the degree to which the impact of selection method is attributable to a selection effect (i.e., election officials choose the method of selection that reflects their preferences) versus incentives and socialization effects once an individual takes a position. In addition, we cannot determine whether the turnout effect is caused by acts of omission or acts of commission. An elected clerk who is motivated to facilitate voter access might engage in proactive efforts such as educating voters, increasing the ballot supply, and locating the most accommodating polling places. On the other hand, an appointed clerk who is less directly accountable to the public might simply not do these things.
What we can say is that it appears that partisanship is driving the result for appointed officials.
Including attitudes toward EDR and absentee voting in the turnout models did not alter the fundamental relationship between method of selection and turnout. Moreover, all of this occurred in an administrative environment where all clerks, whether elected or appointed, are officially non-partisan. One might imagine even larger effects in states where partisanship is more overt.
Our findings inform an ongoing policy debate about the strengths and weaknesses of various institutional designs in the administration of elections, a subject about which we know little. Descriptive statistics indicate that appointed clerks may possess greater skills and expertise, as they tend to be better educated, have greater experience, and are more often fulltime professionals. But we provide some evidence that elected officials administer elections in a less biased fashion than appointed officials.
All of this brings into greater relief the inconsistency between how local election officials are actually selected and what voters would prefer. Unwittingly or not, public desire for elections as the selection method for election officials tilts administration in a direction that favors access over security. Insulation from political pressures has its benefits, but it may also make administrators less concerned with the wishes of the public, and overly concerned with administrative burdens. While there are problems in assuming that the public consists of informed principals who actively monitor local election officials, the findings do suggest that elected agents pursue to a greater extent the perceived wishes of the public. In nonpartisan positions, which the public also prefers, election also deters selective actions that permit local election officials to increase voter participation only when it favors their party. Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, *** p < .01, two-tailed. Models are OLS regressions. Standard errors clustered by county.
